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THE MARCH OF WAR
SOUTHERN ITALY
(August 29 to November 75, 7943)-
AT the end of August the A1lies madeseveral vain attempts to gain a foot-hold on the Italian mainland, all of
them on a rniJl0r scale. But in the early
morning hours of September 3, an invasion
witb major forces began. MOOr a violent artil-
lery prepa,ration and under strong naval and
air protection, one British tank division and
one Canadian infantry division of General
Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army were
landed between ViUa San Giovanni and
Reggio Calabria. ubsequent landings near
Cerarnida, Palmi, and--on September 8-in
the Gulf of Ellferuia, brought the Allied forces
in Calabria, lip to four divisions, which con-
tinued to recei ve reinforcements. The few
German defenders fought a gallant rearguard
action calculated to slow up the enemy's
advance. They blew up roads, laid exten-
sive minc fields (which caused the British
severe losses), and succeeded in evading all
effort at eneil·clement.
SL"RPRISE AT SALERNO
On September 8, the American Fifth
Army under General Mark Clark, including
also the British Tenth Army Corps as well
as some Canactian troops, started large-scale
landing operations in the Gulf of Salerno.
The &nnouncement of Badoglio's surrender
au' the following day made it clear that the
Allied High Command expected to exploit
the situation to the fullest. Naples was to
be occupied, and further large contingents
were to be landed there, while a quick
thrust in an easterly direction toward Poten-
za and a junction with the Eighth Army
were to cut off the German formations in
Calabria. But, apart from the fact that the
advance of the Eighth Army was much
slower than expected, a big surprise was in
Btore for the Allies in the fighting around the
Gulf of Salerno.
The Allied landing fleet was subjected to
heavy a.ttacks by the Luftwaffe. But.,
under cover of the guns of strong Allied
naval forces and in spite of heavy loases,
seven infantry and tank divisions of the
Fifth Army were put ashore during the first
three days. The British troops formed Ii.
bridgehead in the Salerno area and tried to
enlarge t.heir foothold in a northerly' and
westerly direction. American and Canadian
di visions took over the eastern shore of the
gulf and advanced to the heights south of
Eboli, where in two days of heavy fighting
they attempted to break through to
Potenza. However, by September 13 they
had. been weakened to such an extent that
they were forced to abandon their original
plan and to limit themselves to defense.
It was at this moment that tue G~rman
Command struck back. Just as the invaders
were beginning to entrench themselves,
German tank and mechanized forces rushed
down on a broad front from their hillside
positions. In a brief but bitter engage-
ment they split the enemy into small groups
which were put to rout. Large quantities
of arms and equipment were left behind or
t.hrown away. In outflanking maneuvers
some of the enemy groups were iBolated
and thousands of men taken prisoner. By
wresting Battipaglia from the invaders, the
Germans also drove a wedge between the
Anglo-American groups in the Salerno and
Eboli areas.
1.11 the Salerno sector, the BritiBh troops
fared no better. Their push toward Vietri
and then in the direction of the Nocera plain
was stemmed by a powerful couuterattack
from two directions which threw them back
to the coastal strip of Vietri. Although
further landings were carried out on the
western end of the Sorrento peninsula, the
advance along the coastal road to Amalfi
and a tank thrust from Salerno toward the
north failed to relieve the British.
While all this was going on, the Eighth
Army was feeling its way northward along
the western coast of Calabria. Further to
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the easl., Taranto (September 12) and
Brinui8i were pla.yed into t.he hands of tIl('
Briii h by Badoglio troops.
In order to speed lip help fur the battered
lIn.its of the Fifth Army at Salerno, the AWed
High Command decided to di patch part of
Genernl Montgomery's forces by Rca. During
the night of September Ii, about one and
a half divi:;ionJ:l of tank allu motorized units
were landed in the ar a of l~aC! tum llnd
Agropoli. Another tank brigade embarked
to strengthen t.he troop' in the alemo sector.
Then the Germans, after two weeks of
fighting and after having united with their
comrade:; who had be n engaged in Calabria
and Apulia, hI' 'an to detach themselve.
The front, wbich bad run from Salerno in
a southeasterly direction, was taken back
011 the left wing, with alorno as the pivot.
10 tbe two weeks' battle of Ralemo, three
German divisions, sOllie of thom of Sicilian
fame, stood up ngainst forcos vastly superior
in nllmlx-r and enjoying complete nand
supwl1Iacy. The 36th VI-; Jnfantry Di\'ision
was practically wiped out. Tbe employment
of Allied parachutist formation;;, which was
attempted by the British nenr Castellamll.re
and by the American8 in the VCSU\riuB area,
end d in their annihilation. Anglo-American
casualtie numbered fit. least 10,000 killed
and wounded. The GormmJs took 4,429
prisoners and destroyed or captured 153
tanks, U.':l well as a lot of other equipment.
Between . ptemuer H Ilnd 17, units of the
German Luftwaffe and Navy !:lank 3 cruisers,
2 destroyers, one torpcdoboat, 15 landing
boats, and 9 transports apart from an even
larger number of vessels they damaged.
TOlJOH OOINU
At the bf'ginning of October, General
~lontgol1lcrY'8 forccs had ad\-aneed to a li.ne
running roughly frum Manfredonia to Bovino,
while in the west the fighting centered around
Avellino and Mount Vf' II\-ius. On 0 tober
2, Na.plc8 wus evucuated by the Germans
after thoy had hlown up all installations
that might. be of usc to the enemy and
had rendered tbe harbor unfit u.s a naval
and military basc.
Since t hen it has been tough going for
the Anglo-Americllnli, Ull t.he defenders have
made full use of th extrem Iv mountainous
termin, where small deta.clllilCnts in well-
camouflaged po itions lue able to inflict
serious los8os upon an enemy ploddi.ng along
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roads exposed to flank attacks from steep
heights. Although fa.r inferior in numbers,
the Germans did not confine themselvcs to
warding off the Allies: they often made
counterattacks or launched surprise thrusts.
Every strategic point was transformed
into a hedgehog position and tenaciously
defended. The Allies ha.ve, therefore, been
compelled to undertake the wearying busi·
ness of removing one obstacle after another
without being able to start the expected
Ja,rge-scale operations.
The valley of the upper Volturno River
-continued in a northwcsterly direction by
the valley of the upper Garigliano and
SMCO Rivers, with Cassino &s its gateway-
is of particular strategic importance since
it forms the main road to Rome. (The
widening coastal strip leading to Rome
is impracticable for a large.scale adYance,
as the Pontine Marshes form a natural
barrier across this strip.) Hence, at the
time of going to pres.'!, the fighting for access
to this road is especially violent. Our map
shows the inconsiderable Allied advance
between October 15 and November 15.
In view of the Allied naval superiority,
it is remarkable that, with the exception of
a major landing maneuver at Termoli on
October 5 and of some minor ones north·
west of that city and north of the mouth
of the Volturno River at a later date, no
amphibian operations were attempted during
the period under re\riew. A squadron of
warships which tried to bombard the port
of Gaeta on November 1 was driven off by
German coastal defense guns.
On the Allied right wing this lack of
amphibian maneuvers is probably due to
their lack of sufficient shipping and to the
fact that the eastern shore of the Adriatic
is under German control. Such operations
are, therefore, threatened by attacks from
air bases on the Dalmatian coo. t. Moreover,
judging by his African campaign, General
Montgomery is averse to starting any large.
scale operations without superior numbers
in men and material, which he is at pres-
ent engaged in assembling before venturing
to smash through the Sangro line.
On the Allied left wing, the US Fifth
Anny is now facing strong defense positions
in the mountainous terrain running from
Formia to Isernia. To break through this
line would demand great sacrifices. On the
other hand, the outflanking of these posi.
tions by means of an amphibian enterprise
is more likely to be attempted, as the
Anglo.Americans have bases on Sardinia
and Corsica to protect naval operations in
the Tyrrhenian Sea. Hence large.scale
landings similar to those in thc Salerno
area may be reckoned with.
GERMAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS
While the battle on the Italian peninsula.
was going on, the German positions in
central and northern Italy were being con·
solidated. All Italian armies were dis·
armed, the lines of communication secured,
and all important passes and tunnels in the
Alps taken over by German troops. Italian
formations in the occupied t~rritorie.s were
likewise replaced by German or other Axis
troops. The resistance offered by Ilomo
Italian formations was quickly broken.
The strategically important islands of Corfu
at the entrance to the Adriatic and of Rhodes
in the Dodecanese group were secured, and
the British who, with the connivance of
the Italian commanders, had "OCcupied
various other islands in the' Aegean,
especially Kos and Leros, were either
wiped out or taken prisoner.
On the other hand, the naval superiority
of the Allies in the Mediterranean neces-
sitated the evacuation of the i lands of
Sardinia and Corsica, all troops together
with their entire equipment being ferried
across to the mainland.
The treason of King Victor Emmanuel
and his Government made the period under
review a. most critical one for the German
forces in Italy. But, without a mom nt's
hesitation, the German High Command
mastered the dangers threatening from out·
side as well as lurking in the rear of tbo
German divisions. Central Italy is being
defended by a large army under Field Marshal
Kesselring, only a small part of which has
been sent into battle as yet; while in the
north another army under Field Marshal
R.ommel is guarding Italy's most important
agricultural and industria.l centers. This as
well as the numerous deeds of individuaJ
bravery-outstanding among which was the
rescue of Mu solini by a handful of Germans
from a mountain top 2,100 meters high-
have shown German morale to be unbroken
and have caused the Allied High Command
to desist from boldly exploiting an oppor-
tunity on which many Anglo-American
hopes rested. As General Sir Harold Alex-
ander phrased it in a communique: "All
roads lead to Rome, but unfortunately all
these roads are mined and their bridges
blown up."
